25 June 2019
12 min read
#Planning, Environment & Sustainability
Published by:
Summary
This was a compulsory acquisition case concerning an application for judicial review and declaratory relief in circumstances where the Governor in Council has certified that no reservation of land was required before service of a Notice of Intention to Acquire. The plaintiffs sought to challenge the procedural steps under the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (LAC Act), from the initial recommendation by the Attorney-General to the Minister that reservation of the land was ‘unnecessary, undesirable or contrary to the public interest’ under section 5(3) of the LAC Act, up to the publication of the Notice of Acquisition under section 19.
While Justice Garde found that there was no obligation to afford procedural fairness or right to be heard at the point of recommendation or certification under section 5(3) or delivery of a Notice of Intention to Acquire under section 6, His Honour held that there is a right to be afforded procedural fairness at the point prior to the delivery of a Notice of Acquisition.
What does this mean for acquiring authorities?
At present, the prescribed form of the Notice of Intention to Acquire (as set out at section 8 of the LAC Act) and the accompanying Form 4 of the Land Acquisition and Compensation Regulations 2010 does not specifically require the acquiring authority to give the interest holder an opportunity to be heard in relation to the proposed acquisition.
In light of the decision of Caligiuri & Anor v Attorney General (on behalf of the State of Victoria) & Ors (No 2), in order to afford procedural fairness to the interest holder it would be prudent for an acquiring authority to address the following in its covering letter to the interest holder when serving the Notice of Intention to Acquire:
The acquiring authority or its delegates must give serious consideration to what is submitted by the interest holders and act fairly in making its decision as to whether and how the acquisition should proceed. From the reasons given in this decision, by doing so the acquiring authority will be affording procedural fairness to the interest holder.
Detailed case summary: Caligiuri & Anor v Attorney General (on behalf of the State of Victoria) & Ors (No 2) [2019] VSC 365
Introduction
The plaintiffs sought judicial review and declaratory relief concerning four decisions made under the LAC Act towards achieving the compulsory acquisition of land at 170 and 174 Donovan’s Lane Beveridge. The third defendant, Melbourne Water, and the fourth defendant, Yarra Valley water, were Water Authorities that had served notices to compulsorily acquire 5.64 ha of land together with 3.89 ha of easements. They proposed to construct water storage tanks and supply infrastructure on and near Bald Hill on the property as part of the Yan Yean to Bald Hill Pipeline Project. The plaintiff was a developer that had purchased the property from the registered proprietor. It intended to develop the property as a residential subdivision.
The key issue in this proceeding was whether the plaintiff was entitled to be heard by the relevant decision maker prior to the making of each of the following challenged decisions:
The plaintiff contended that it was entitled to a hearing prior to the exercise by the Minister or Governor in Council of its power of recommendation contained in section 53 of the LAC Act.
The plaintiff then contended that it was entitled to a hearing by the authorities prior to their decision to serve the notice of intention to acquire, or the notice of acquisition.
In reaching his decision, Justice Garde gave detailed consideration to relevant case law concerning procedural fairness, and the right to a hearing.
Procedural fairness and the right to a hearing
Justice Garde found that the statutory framework of the LAC Act was of paramount importance when considering whether procedural fairness requires a right to a hearing before the challenged decision can be made. If a right to a hearing is implied, the content of the right must be determined according to the statutory intent and in the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
An intention to exclude procedural fairness should not be inferred from the presence in the statute of some rights which were commensurate with some of the rules of procedural fairness. The provisions of the LAC Act should not be taken as excluding the plaintiff’s right to a hearing.
The Minister and the authorities made submissions that procedural fairness was excluded by the LAC Act by implication.
Did the Minister or Attorney General have a duty to afford procedural fairness?
For the following reasons, Justice Garde held that a ‘right to be heard’ did not exist prior to the exercise of the powers of recommendation and certification in section 5(3) of the LAC Act:
Did the acquiring authorities have a duty to afford procedural fairness, and if so, when?
The plaintiff submitted that it was entitled to be heard prior to the exercise by the authorities of the power to serve a notice of intention to acquire under section 6 of the LAC Act or to publish a notice of acquisition under section 19.
Notice of intention to acquire
His Honour found that the statutory obligation placed on the acquiring authority by section 6 of the LAC Act to make diligent inquiries and serve a notice of intention to acquire on persons with an interest in the land operated as a step in affording procedural fairness
The fact that this step is part of procedural fairness points against the implication of a right to be heard before the power in section 6 is exercised. It points in favour of the implication of procedural fairness after the notice is given
At [151] of the decision, the Court noted that “it would be strange indeed if procedural fairness required a statutory notice of intention to be preceded by an earlier notice advising of an intention to issue such a notice.”
Notice of acquisition
Justice Garde held that a person with an interest in land cannot, and should not, be deprived of that interest without the opportunity of being heard by the acquiring authority. Procedural fairness requires that a person who may be deprived of an interest in land, or whose interest in land may be diminished, should have an opportunity to be heard by the acquiring authority before the interest is lost or diminished.
A right to a hearing would provide a person with an interest in land with the opportunity of making a submission and providing supporting information and material to the acquiring authority.
The Court found that it was complementary to the statutory scheme that a person with an interest in land to be acquired is given the opportunity to be heard by the authority before the interest in land is taken or diminished (i.e upon publication of the Notice of Acquisition), for the following reasons (see [153(a)-(k)]:
Did the authorities provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to be heard prior to publishing the notice of acquisition?
The Court found that the authorities did not afford the plaintiffs procedural fairness, or a fair and unbiased hearing of their objections and concerns prior to the decision to publish the notice of acquisition.
No evidence was found that at any stage the authorities invited the plaintiffs to make a submission to the decision-makers within the authority or its delegates. There was nothing to suggest that the plaintiffs were given notice that they would be heard within a specified timeframe.
Justice Garde found that the procedural fairness at least required the authorities to afford the plaintiffs the opportunity of providing written submissions and other material including expert material as to the effect of the acquisition on them and their proposed subdivision of the property. Just as importantly, procedural fairness required the decision-makers within the authorities or their delegates to give serious consideration to what was submitted by the plaintiffs and to act fairly in making a decision as to whether and how the acquisition should proceed.
On the question of timeframes, the plaintiff submitted that it would not be unreasonable if the time allowed for them to make a written submission was to be a minimum of two weeks. The Court accepted that procedural fairness is flexible and practical in its content, and that a period of up to one month for written submissions and other material to be provided reflected what procedural fairness required in the circumstances.
Conclusion
Procedural fairness requires that a person whose interest in land is to be compulsorily acquired by an authority has, and should have, the right to be heard by the acquiring authority prior to a decision by that authority to take the person’s interest in land. This right arises prior to service of a Notice of Acquisition.
Author: Tess Kerridge
Disclaimer
The information in this publication is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity. Although we endeavour to provide accurate and timely information, we do not guarantee that the information in this newsletter is accurate at the date it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future.
Published by: